Does analytic philosophy have anything interesting to say about consciousness?

Philosophers, particularly those in the analytic tradition, are very good at defining problems, but not so good at actually answering them. This is particularly obvious in their attempts to address the problem of consciousness. Here the problem is well defined, but although there has been a lot said, most of it is highly speculative and flawed.

At the heart of the problem of consciousness is a mystery: there is a subjective, felt quality to experience that isn’t explained by science. Science can explain how stubbing my toe causes nerves to fire which carry a signal to my brain that I have damaged my toe, but there is no accepted explanation for the subjective experience of pain this causes. We understand how the ear works and how aural signals are sent to the brain, we have an understanding of how these signals are processed by the brain, but we don’t have an understanding of the feeling that comes with listening to a beautiful piece of music.

The felt quality the accompanies mental experience has been described by David Chalmers as the Hard Problem of consciousness (Chalmers 2010). This is in contrast to the easier problems of consciousness. The easier problems are those

The modern arguments about consciousness tend to be between two points of view. Physicalists hold that everything is physical; there is nothing beyond the physical world. One implication of this view is that science should be able to explain everything in the physical world, our minds are physical and so science should be able to explain consciousness; descriptions of mental processes, such as subjective experience, will reduce to descriptions of physical processes. In the opposing camp are the dualists, these hold that while there are physical processes, there are other mental processes that aren’t physical; consciousness is not a physical process and so not explainable by science.

Physicalists think that as science has done a pretty good job of explaining the world so far there’s no reason why it can’t ultimately explain consciousness. Dualists are driven by an intuition that it doesn’t seem possible to reduce the rich variety of human experience down to the basic properties of the brain. There appears to be an explanatory gap between phenomenological experience and brain processes

There are a number of arguments used by dualists to support this perceived explanatory gap. The conceivability argument says that

Both physicalism and dualism rely on intuitions. Physicalism on the idea that science will eventually be able to explain consciousness. Dualism on the intuition that there is more to consciousness than the brain; that reducing consciousness to the brain somehow demeans it. Philosophers from both sides have spent a lot of time arguing for their position and against the other side. These arguments generally fail because they beg the question – they presuppose the answer they want to prove. Things which seem obvious to one side, seem ridiculous to the other. A lot of time has been spent coming up with highly speculative, but ultimately rubbish theories (they’re rubbish because they don’t include any way to validate them). What has had far less time spent on is why we have these intuitions in the first place. Basing a whole theory off an intuition is not putting it on firm ground – deny the intuition and you deny the theory. Further, in the scientific tradition, any good theory is testable.

So, where does this leave the philosophy of consciousness?

Analytic philosophy has always aspired to a certain level of rigour, it bases arguments in logic, which in theory can be used to determine whether an argument is true or false. In practice this means that an argument is only good as the assumptions it’s built on. Arguments built solely on intuitions are poor arguments. So one fruitful area of investigation might be where our intuitions come from and whether they are a good guide to reality. It is not clear that the sort of introspection our intuitions rely on are even useful to the investigation of the conscious mind. Some of this can only be answered through empirical study, which is the realm of science, but by framing the question – as Chalmers has done with the Hard Problem – scientists can focus their research and have an idea what a good theory will have to answer. By defining problems, philosophers allow people in different disciplines to understand what the problems really are and what a good answer will look like.

I suspect that part of the reason for the intuition of dualism is the fear that if scientists were to come up with a comprehensive theory of mind it would strip consciousness of some of its wonder. This is silly. Science can explain how mountains and rocks form, knowledge of this doesn’t remove the majesty of mountain views – far from it – knowledge of plate tectonics and rock formation provide an additional way to appreciate such things. Knowledge of painting techniques and art history increase the number of ways an artwork can be appreciated; knowledge and understanding add to the experience. A complete scientific theory of mind would enhance the wonder of the mind, not detract from it. There will still be the human condition of joys and pains.

Perhaps, analytic philosophers should become more continental and spend more time discussing the human condition and what it means to be conscious; there might end up being more truth in what they say, even if they have to give up some of their rigour in doing so.

I finish this essay on a personal note. When studying philosophy of mind at an undergraduate level I was excited by the arguments, I felt there was truth to be had somewhere in them, even if the arguments were often strange in comparison to other areas of philosophy I was studying. Having recently returned to study the philosophy of consciousness at a postgraduate level, I have been left feeling the vapidity of the arguments; notable how so many of the arguments presuppose their answer. This has left me disappointed with this whole area of philosophy. I hope that this might be a passing feeling, as there should be plenty of room for philosophers to make progress when it comes to the mind: just not when it comes to consciousness.

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